

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-05

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R 101607Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION USBERLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0462

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN UNN

AMEMBASSY BONN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEXBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USBERLIN 0249

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG, GE, UR, WB

SUBJECT: SOVIET STANCE ON BERLIN

REF: (A) MOSCOW 1226; (B) MOSCOW 1450

1. SUMMARY: SOVIETS HERE HAVE PURSUED TWO PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES IN THEIR BERLIN POLICY: TO FORESTALL EXPANSION OF BONN-BERLIN TIES AND TO SEEK A VOICE FOR THEMSELVES IN ADMINISTRATION OF WEST BERLIN. POSSIBLY BECAUSE THERE ARE REAL CONSTRAINTS UPON HOW FAR THEY CAN GO IN PURSUING THESE OBJECTIVES, THEIR ACTIONS HAVE NOT HAD SERIOUS EFFECT ON THE CITY.

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SOVIETS HAVE BEEN REASONABLY CORRECT IN THEIR POST-QA

DEALINGS WITH ALLIES. END SUMMARY.

2. MISSION AGREES FULLY WITH CONCLUSIONS OF REF A ON SOVIET POLICY TOWARD BERLIN. SOVIET ACTIVITIES HERE TEND TO CONFIRM JUDGEMENT THAT SOVIET POLICY SINCE CONCLUSION OF QA HAS BEEN CONSISTENT EFFORT TO PUSH IDEA OF WEST BERLIN AS SEPARATE POLITICAL ENTITY IN WHICH SOVIETS HAVE SIGNIFICANT ROLE TO PLAY.

3. WE AGREE THAT SOVIETS ARE NOT INCLINED TO COMPROMISE ON BERLIN ISSUES (REF A, PARA 7). ESPECIALLY ON THOSE RAISED IN PRESS. RATHER, THEY HAVE SOUGHT CONSISTENTLY TO DISCOURAGE ADDITIONAL BONN-BERLIN TIES, E.G. , THEIR PROTESTS, SOMETIMES LOW KEY, SOMETIMES NOT, ABOUT FEDERAL ENVIROMENTAL AGENCY, EC VOCATIONAL CENTER, AND GREEN WEEK (REF B), AND EVEN YEFREMOV'S REMARKS ABOUT HEINRICH HERZ PHARMACOLOGICAL INSTITUTE (BERLIN 2075, NOV 12, 1974). SOMETIMES SOVIETS ARE HARD PUSHED TO PRODUCE ARGUMENTATION SUPPORTING THEIR OPPOSITION TO NON-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN BERLIN AND HAVE TO RESORT TO SUCH OBVIOUSLY SPECIOUS ARGUMENTS AS "SLIPPERY SLOPE" IN CASE OF 26 MAN EC VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTER. SIMILARLY, THEY WERE ON WEAK GROUNDS IN OPPOSING GOVMAYOR SCHUETZ'S APPOINTMENT AS GERMAN COMMISSIONER FOR FRANCO-GERMAN CULTURAL COOPERATION. NEVERTHELESS, POINT THEY ARE MAKING IN THESE PROTESTS AS WELL AS IN DRUMFIRE OF MESSAGES COMPLAINING ABOUT EXTENSION TO BERLIN OF THIS OR THAT PIECE OF INNOCUOUS LEGISLATION IS CLEAR: BERLIN IS TO BE TREATED AS SEPARATE POLITICAL ENTITY REGARDLESS OF WHAT QA SAYS ABOUT PERMISSIBLE FRG-BERLIN TIES.

4. OTHER THRUST OF SOVIET BERLIN POLICY IS TO OBTAIN FOR SOVIETS DROIT DE REGARD IN WEST BERLIN. IT IS NOT HARD CURRENCY NEEDS THAT HAVE SENT STREAM OF SOVIET CULTURAL FIGURES TO WEST BERLIN, SUCH AS RECENT APPEARANCES, ARRAGED AT LAST MINUTE, OF SOVIET PRIMA BALLERINA PLISETSKAYA. RAHTER, SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO CONVEY IMPRSSION OF INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT
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AND EFFECTIVE PRESENCE IN CITY. SAME GOAL IS PURSUED BY ACTIVE WEST BERLIN SECTION OF SOVIET EMB IN EAST BERLIN, WHICH REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE SENAT IN SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS, AND BY CONGEN STAFF IN WEST BERLIN, WHOSE COVERAGE OF NON-POLITICAL MATTERS HAS BEEN THOROUGH AND PENETRATING -- WITHIOUT BEINGSO BLATANT AS TO GIVE ALLIES SOLID GROUND FOR PROTEST. IN SOVIET THEORY, ALLIED OCCUPATION CONTINUES

IN WEST BERLIN ONLY, AND IT GIVES THEM RIGHT TO
CRITICIZE PARTICIPATION OF CONSERVATIVE BUND FREIES
DEUTSCHLAND (BFD) IN BERLIN ELECTIONS (USBERLIN 164)
OR TO CLAIM THAT FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS WERE
REQUIRED PRIOR TO DECISION TO ESTABLISH EC VOCATIONAL
CENTER IN BERLIN.

5. THIS SAID, WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE WHAT WE SEE
AS REAL LIMITS IMPOSED BY SOVIET-GERMAN POLICY ON HOW
FAR SOVIETS CAN DISTORT QA REALITITES. IF THEY BLUSTER
TOO MUCH, BENEFICIARIES IN BERLIN (AND FRG) CAN ONLY BE
THOSE ELEMENTS MOST SKEPTICAL ABOUT DETENTE GENERALLY
AND OSTPOLITIK IN PARTICULAR. SOVIETS THEREFORE
GENERALLY TEND TO DRAW BACK FROM AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS,
HAVING MADE THEIR POINTS AND HAVING AGAIN SERVED NOTICE
ON BONN THAT THEY HAVE DRAWN A HYPOTHETICAL LINE WHICH
WILL GOVERN FUTURE ACTIONS (FEA IS CASE IN POINT).
ON ISSUES SUCH AS GDR NATIONALITY, LEGAL ASSISTANCE
AND TO SOME EXTENT INCLUSION OF WEST BERLINERS IN
FRG DELEGATIONS, THEY CAN ASSUME HARD POSITION IN
KNOWLEDGE THAT FEW PEOPLE IN FRG UNDERSTAND THESE
COMPLEX SUBJECTS. AS FAR AS ALLIES ARE CONCERNED,
THEY OBSERVE DIPLOMATIC NICETIES AND HAVED
GENERALLY BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE ON ACCESS AND BASC
QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE COME UP OVER THE PAST HALF YEAR.
ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT BE ENTIRELY CERTAIN, THEY CLAIM TO
HAVE INTERCEDED WITH THE GDR OCCASIONALLY ON OUR
BEHALF, AND THEY PLAYED A RELATIVELY HELPFUL ROLE IN
MEDLEY EXFILTRATION CASE LAST SEPTEMBER. IN OTHER
WORDS, A SOVIET TOUGH LINE SOON BECOMES COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVE IN OVERALL SOVIET RELATIONS WITH FRG, WHILE
THEIR BEHAVIOUR ON THE SCENE HAS BEEN REASONABLY
CORRECT.

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INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 L-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0463

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AMEMBASSY BONN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USBERLIN 0249

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

6. THUS, WHILE TEMPERATURE MAY GO UP OR DOWN A FEW DEGREES DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SEE NO EVIDENCE OF A "DEEP FREEZE" IN SOVIET BERLIN POLICY BUT ONLY OF ANTICIPATED LACK OF GIVE ON SOVIETS PART. MAIN SOVIET ACHIEVEMENT -- AND A TROUBLESOME ONE -- IS THAT THEY HAVE MANAGED TO PLACE EFFECTIVE LIMITS ON BONN'S ABILITY TO REINFORCE BONN-BERLIN TIES. (GERMANS THEMSELVES ARE PARTLY TO BLAME, HOWEVER, BY TENDING TO POLITICIZE FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL RESONS ACTIONS THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE ELICIT LESS SERIOUS REACTION.) WE CAN LIVE WITH THIS SITUATION BUT MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT SOME DEVELOPMENT OF BONN-BERLIN TIES, WHATEVER THEIR POLITICAL MERITS, ARE CONFIDENTIAL

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ESSENTIAL TO ECONOMIC VIABILITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELFARE OF CITY. HOWEVER, IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE GENERALLY AND OF RELATIONS WITH AN SPD-LED FRG IN PARTICULAR, LEAD US TO CONCLUSION THAT SOVIETS ALSO OPERATE WITHIN FAIRLY NARROW CIRCLE OF OPTIONS. WE THERE FORE EXPECT ADDITIONAL BLUSTER AND OCCASIONAL THREATENING LANGUAGE WHICH WILL CONTRAST WITH ROUSING WELCOMES FOR BRANDT AND OTHER "GOOD GERMANS" IN THE

USSR IN THIS PARTICULAR APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL
CARROT-AND -STICK DIPLOMACY. FOR BERLIN RESULT SHOULD
CONTINUE TO BE TOLERABLE. GEORGE

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